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Jon Baldwin: You write that, “[i]t might at  rst blush
appear that the opening of the twenty- rst century has
seen one more ‘turn to religion.’” (p.12) This is then
problematized, in Badiou’s case, as a turn away from
politics or, in Nancy, as merely the contortions of the
exhaustion of religion. What are your thoughts on the
possibilities and dangers afforded by the (re)turn to
religion?
Christopher Watkin: To begin with, I don’t think that the
notions of a “turn” or a “return” to religion do justice to
the complexity of what has happened in philosophy over
recent decades, or to what we can see in society more
broadly. The idea of such a turn is beset with the same
reductionism as the classic secularization thesis. Part of
the problem is that “religion” is almost always considered
too super cially. It is assumed that any discourse
employing terms like “faith”, “miracle” or even “God” must
necessarily be religious, and that by implication the lack
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of such terms is a reliable indication of the absence of
religion. This is a grave error. Meillassoux, for example, is
very happy to embrace the notion of miracle, and sees it
as an important proof that God does not exist. I have
critiqued elsewhere this sloppy tendency to go hunting
for religious words, and have given it the name
“ornitheology”. So one of the dangers, perhaps the main
one, is a careless or super cial understanding of what it
is that constitutes the religious in the  rst place, such
that one can turn away from or towards it.
If we dig below the surface and think about religion not
in terms of listening out, bingo-like, for certain key terms
but as a series of structures or rhythms of thought and
life then the problem is more acutely posed but no more
easily answered. The dif culty is this: what counts as a
“religious” way of thinking or acting? Nancy takes to task
the sort of position that Badiou holds, characterising it as
clinging onto what he calls the move of the “Christmas
projection”, the idea of a historical rupture that arrives
suddenly and changes everything, like the incarnation in
Christianity. But in his own terms Badiou has no problem
inscribing his crucial historical break – the rupture of the
matheme from the mytheme – within a non-religious
story. So how are we to decide what counts as “religious”?
Is Badiou’s account of history religious, or isn’t it?
It is often assumed in this debate that any intellectual
move present within religion is necessarily religious, or
in other words that religion holds the copyright on
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everything it thinks and does, with the consequence that
when non-religious thought uses those same moves it
only ever does so illegally. This is too simple. We need to
be careful to make the distinction, case by case, between,
on the one hand, the various moves and structures of
religious thought and, on the other hand, what is
assumed to be irreducible the “religiosity” of certain ways
of thinking. Not all religious ways of thinking (in the  rst
sense) are necessarily “religious” (in the second sense).
But some are… so there are no quick and easy answers.
Let’s take faith as an example. In the book I trace Nancy’s
argument that every philosophical position must sooner
or later recur to a principle or set of starting assumptions
that it cannot establish in its own terms, because without
them it cannot think anything at all. If positing such
principles is a moment of “faith” then faith is universal.
Where do you go from there? Do you conclude that there
is a “religious” moment in all thought, or do you conclude
that faith is not religious after all? Neither of those two
answers is rendered unavoidable simply by virtue of the
ubiquity of faith. Some other value or assumption must
be brought in, explicitly or implicitly, to inform our
answer, but what? Whatever that supplement may be, it
remains that to identify a moment of faith within a
particular philosophical system would not, in this case,
imply anything at all about whether that system were
part of a “turn to religion” or not in any deep sense.
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To sum up, I think the notion of a “turn to religion”
assumes too much and says too little. It assumes too
much when it proceeds on the basis that there is
something identi able and localizable called “religion”
away from which we have turned and to which we can
return, whereas I think a much  ner-grained analysis is
afforded if we understand modern philosophy in terms of
a series of ways of recon guring the moves and
structures of religion rather than departing from them
and then returning. The “turn to religion” says too little,
 nally, because it does not ask what – for me at least –
is the really important question: what makes a particular
intellectual move “religious” in the  rst place?
Jon Baldwin: Dif cult Atheism opens with the suggestion
that French philosophy is trying to come to terms with
the death of God more rigorously than ever before, to
think ‘without God’, and move “beyond the simple term
‘atheism”. (p.1) Insofar as the book concerns itself with
dif cult atheism(s) can you say something about this
simple term ‘atheism’? And what are your thoughts on
the popular atheism of the so-called ‘Four Horsemen of
atheism’ (Dennett, Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris)? In
these cases it would seem that atheism, no less than
theism, can be used as a pretext, a rhetorical cover, and
manipulated in ulterior causes?
Christopher Watkin: The main problem with atheism as it
is usually understood is that it assumes one or more of
the structures of the theism it seeks to deny. What is not
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often made explicit in discussions of atheism is that it
can do this in two separate ways. The  rst way is what in
the book I call “residual” or “ascetic” atheism. This view
accepts the religious account of reality according to
which certain notions that have traditionally been central
to our way of thinking and living in the world rely on a
transcendent deity: trans-historically and transculturally
invariant notions of truth and justice, to give two of the
main examples. This residual atheism feels obliged to
renounce all such notions when it turns its back on God,
and there is perhaps no passage which shows this more
vividly than the madman parable in Nietzsche’s Die
fröhliche Wissenschaft. More broadly, this type of atheism
tries to live in one half of the religious universe: the half
which Heidegger, in the essay ‘Nietzsches Wort: Gott ist
tot’ calls the “sensible” as opposed to the “supersensible”.
It inherits this religious split more or less
unquestioningly, and merely dispenses with one of the
two domains.
The second option, and here we are getting closer to the
Four Horsemen you mentioned, is “imitative” or
“parasitic” atheism. Whereas residual atheism, to its
credit, is aware that certain patterns of thought rely on
notions of transcendence and personality that are readily
afforded by the Western monotheistic religions but
extremely dif cult (if not impossible) to achieve without
God, imitative atheism insouciantly ploughs on under the
impression that it can neatly excise God from the picture
without having in any fundamental way to rethink
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notions like truth and justice. This atheism, I argue in the
book, remains structurally parasitic upon the religion that
it rhetorically rejects.
So to bring these ideas together, what we are really
dealing with here, schematically at least, are two
extremisms. The  rst assumes that nothing touched by
religion can survive the death of God, and the second
proceeds as though the death of God changes nothing
apart from the erudite theological detail of divine
existence. They are the mirror image of each other, just
as both of them – in different ways – mirror theism.
It is also worth stressing that “residual” and “imitative”
atheism are ideal types rather than absolute categories,
and almost all atheistic positions will conjure with some
sort of combination of the two. Nevertheless, we can say
that they share the common dif culty of de ning
themselves in terms of the very thing they seek to deny.
This is one of the reasons why, as I said in my response
to the previous question, I think it is more helpful to
think in terms of restructuring or recon guring religious
modes of thinking and living rather than walking away
from them completely and then returning to them.
Religion runs too deep in our intellectual tradition to be
sloughed off like an overcoat.
Jon Baldwin: Jean Baudrillard (2001: 131) suggested that,
“if the hypothesis of God has disappeared – if He is
indeed dead, as Nietzsche said – we still have to deal –
now, and for a long time to come – with His Ghost and
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His metastases.” It seems to me that Dif cult
Atheism concerns itself with this situation, this Ghost and
growths, and the possibility or otherwise of thinking
without them?
Christopher Watkin: That’s an interesting summary, but I
would draw the line somewhat further back than
Baudrillard. The key moment is not the disappearance of
the God hypothesis but rather its emergence, in other
words the moment at which God appears within the
intellectual landscape precisely as a hypothesis, as an
object of human thought rather than as its ground. That
is the point at which, structurally speaking, God ceases to
be God; the disappearance of the hypothesis merely dots
the i’s and crosses the t’s.
I fear that Baudrillard’s formulation is committing the
same error I identi ed in relation to the “turn to religion”
in response to a previous question. We cannot arrive at
an adequate understanding of our current situation if we
try to approach it in terms of thinking “without God”.
There are two reasons for this. First of all, such an
approach fails to interrogate to what extent the different
elements of thinking “with” God are irreducibly religious:
it assumes that religion has the copyright on everything
it touches, or in Baudrillard’s terms that everything that
resembles religion in any way is necessarily a spectre of
the divine. Secondly, it assumes that it is possible fully
and  nally to exorcise all such spectres, which – as
Nancy argues – itself resembles a characteristically
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religious move. So again, it’s impossible to respond to
this question adequately before addressing the more
fundamental issue of what counts as “religious” or as a
ghost of God in the  rst place. Setting up the problem in
terms of “thinking without God” forces us to answer in of
two ways: either that we can think without God, or that
we cannot. Both of these answers alike, however, assume
a black-and-white understanding of being with and
without God, which is part of what I want to challenge in
the book.
Jon Baldwin: In a ‘religionless’ interpretation of
Christianity, blending Lacan and Żiżek, Peter Rollins
(2015: 65) has written that, “[t]he radical reading of
Paul’s work on the dark glass is that the event nestled
within Christianity signi es the smashing of the barrier,
and further, that this destructive act doesn’t reveal a
fullness, but rather confronts us with the traumatic
revelation of an empty space.” The latter sentiment here
seems to particularly resonate with, and illustrate, your
notion of “theology’s colonisation of residual atheism”
(p.8) which “ nds itself quickly consumed by the
unfolding narrative of the God whose death it hails” (p.9).
What are the dangers of certain post-religious theologies
colonising ascetic atheism, and “incorporating atheism’s
moves within its own trajectory”? (p.10)
Christopher Watkin: Dangers for whom? For atheism, the
danger is that an ascetic position positively invites a
post-metaphysical theological response. To put it crassly,
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having killed the God of metaphysics residual atheism
 nds itself surprised by a religion that never believed in
that God anyway, and it sees itself pressed into service as
the handmaid of a post-metaphysical theology, relegated
to the status of a stepping stone on the way to a
theological rebirth. It indignantly  nds out that it
positively facilitates the very thing it thought it was
eradicating.
For theology, on the other hand, the danger is in
parasitizing ascetic atheism, in uncritically embracing the
trajectory of the death of God in its own terms, in such a
way that post-metaphysical theology maintains only a
super cial, semantic, distinction from atheism while
being structurally indistinguishable from it. In other
words, the danger for atheism is that it wakes up to  nd
itself theological after all, and the danger for theology is
that it looks at itself in the mirror and sees only atheism.
The extent to which these two situations are seen as
“dangers” will, of course, depend on one’s understanding
of what atheism, and theology, are and should be, and
that opens a new set of questions about the complex
reasons for adopting one fundamental philosophical set
of assumptions over another. I treat these questions
brie y in the book, but a full analysis would require a
second volume.
One  nal word here: these two dangers – which I have
sketched here only in their broadest terms – are not
completely compatible with each other. If (as the  rst
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danger suggests) atheism  nds itself a stepping stone on
the way to a theological rebirth, then it would seem hard
to reconcile with a theology that (according to the second
danger) is structurally indistinguishable from atheism.
Does atheism  nd itself turned into theology, or is
theology turned into atheism? Surely both cannot
simultaneously be the case. This, once more, is why post-
secular theology needs to be analysed with tools subtler
than the theology/atheism binary. Just because it calls
itself “theology” it does not necessarily follow that post-
secular theology is different to atheism, nor can we
assume it to be the case that “atheism” simpliciter does
not already perform quite adequately some, most or even
all of the moves of this “theology”. As a prolegomenon to
such a deeper analysis, the  rst question to each of these
positions could usefully be “which God(s) do you (not)
believe in?”
Jon Baldwin: If imitative and residual atheisms were
there old game, then the new game is announced to be
the attempt to move beyond these positions and
approach what you term ‘post-theological integration.’
Here, “[a] thinking radically without God is integrated
with a retention of the notions otherwise associated with
God.” (p.13) You identify and discuss elements of this
project in the work of three ‘post-theological’ thinkers:
Alain Badiou’s ‘axiomatic atheism’, Jean-Luc Nancy’s
‘atheology’, and Quentin Meillassoux’s ‘divine inexistence’.
There is a huge risk of simpli cation, but could you
indicate the trajectories here? How might each move
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beyond imitative and residual atheism, whilst not
“renounc[ing] the notions associated with such gods –
namely, truth and justice”? (p.13)
 Christopher Watkin: With the understanding that any
brief response to this question is necessarily going to be
very reductive, let me go right ahead and reduce. Badiou
sets off down the road of post-theological integration by
insisting that “nothing is inaccessible”. In other words,
there is nowhere off limits to human reason, no sacred or
mystical place for God to be hiding. He then seeks to
draw a commitment to universalism and equality out of
his mathematical ontology in terms of what he calls a
“Platonism of the multiple”. It is axiomatic set theory that
gives us the Republican equality and revolutionary
impetus that characterize both Badiou’s philosophy and
his interventions into political debates.
Nancy resists the “Christmas projection” in Badiou’s
thought – namely the idea of “a pure and simple birth”
either of Christianity or a similarly epoch-changing
moment “which one ﬁne day comes along and changes
everything”. His own path to theological integration
passes through his “deconstruction of Christianity”,
seeking not to leap out of Christianity in one bound
(which he dismisses as a religious move), but – as he
puts it – to be faithful to something in Christianity
deeper than Christianity itself, a certain movement of
self-surpassing for which Christianity has only ever been
the “front man”. He, like Badiou, also seeks to draw a
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certain ethic out of his ontology, but in this case it is not
axiomatic set theory but what he calls singular plural
being.
Meillassoux provides the most spectacular example of
post-theological integration in the book, summed up
nowhere more succinctly than in his determination to
believe in God not in spite of the fact that he does not
exist, but because he does not exist. Meillassoux denies
himself no morsel from the cornucopia of religious
delights: miracles, resurrection, justice, even a messianic
 gure he calls the Child of Man. On what basis can he
allow himself such religious fancies within a resolutely
non-theistic frame? Through his principal of factiality,
according to which there is no necessary being and the
only necessity is contingency itself: things could always
be otherwise. If nothing is necessary and anything could
be otherwise then miracles and resurrection pose no
problem, in fact they can be brought as evidence for the
absence of any absolute or necessary laws. There are
some dif culties with this position, especially when it
comes to justice, but they would take too long to unpack
here.
In passing, it’s interesting that almost all Meillassoux
scholars seem embarrassed by this overtly religious
discourse in his thought, prominent though it is in ‘The
Divine Inexistence’. It seems that we don’t know what to
do with someone who denies the existence of God but
believes in the resurrection, and this I suspect is
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testament to the way in which contemporary thought still
holds fast to the oil-and-water binary of theology and
atheism that I have been labouring in these answers to
expose as inadequate and super cial, and that
perpetuates all the simpli cations that beset the split
between residual and imitative atheism.
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